We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a network of roads) based on the report of agents' symmetric, single-peaked preferences over points on that graph. We show that while a strategy-poof, onto rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle on the graph grants one agent a certain amount of decisive power. This result surprisingly characterizes the class of strategy-proof, onto rules both in terms of a certain subclass of such rules for trees and in terms of a parameterized set of generalized median voter schemes.
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number
1253.
Length: Date of creation: Feb 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1253
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Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjöström & Takehiko Yamato, 2004.
"Secure Implementation,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000615, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Tomas Sjostrom & Takehiko Yamato, 2005.
"Secure Implementation,"
Economics Working Papers
0056, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!]
Sjostrom, Tomas & Yamato, Takehiko & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, 2007.
"Secure implementation,"
Theoretical Economics,
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 203-229, September.
[Downloadable!]