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Club theory and household formation

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  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Haller, Hans

Abstract

The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi-member households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists in the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among households where no group of consumers can benefit from forming a new household and valuation equilibria prove equivalent in the absence of consumption externalities, but not in their presence.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 715-724

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:715-724

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jmateco

Related research

Keywords: Household behavior Household formation General equilibrium Clubs;

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References

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  1. Ellickson, Bryan & Grodal, Birgit & Scotchmer, Suzanne & Zame, William R., 2001. "Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 40-77, November.
  2. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  3. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Discussion Papers 99-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    • Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
  4. Robert P. Gilles and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1995. "Decentralization in Replicated Club Economies with Multiple Private Goods," Economics Working Papers 95-243, University of California at Berkeley.
  5. Harold L Cole & Edward C Prescott, 1997. "Valuation equilibrium with Clubs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 912, David K. Levine.
  6. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2005. "Consumption externalities, rental markets and purchase clubs," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 235-253, 01.
  7. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  8. Ellickson, Bryan, 1979. "Competitive equilibrium with local public goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 46-61, August.
  9. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "A Tiebout theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 33-55, August.
  10. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2004. "When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency," CESifo Working Paper Series 1197, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 246-278, May.
  12. Berglas, Eitan, 1976. "On the Theory of Clubs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 116-21, May.
  13. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2001. "Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 347-68, April.
  14. Haller, Hans, 2000. "Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 835-47, November.
  15. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2005. "Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption," CESifo Working Paper Series 1448, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Hideo Konishi, 2009. "Efficient Mixed Clubs: Nonlinear-Pricing Equilibria with Entrepreneurial Managers," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 710, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Sep 2009.
  17. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  18. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 625-41, June.
  19. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2002. "Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation," Discussion Papers 02-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  20. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1988. "Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-49, February.
  21. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2005. "The Affectionate Society: Does Competition for Partners Promote Friendliness?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5030, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  22. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2010. "Bargaining cum Voice," CEPR Discussion Papers 7774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2010. "Trade and welfare: Does industrial organization matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 85-87, November.
  3. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "General Equilibrium with Multi-Member Households and Production," CESifo Working Paper Series 3659, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Hideo Konishi, 2011. "Entrepreneurial Land Developers: Joint Production, Local Externalities, and Mixed Housing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 777, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Apr 2013.
  5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller & Hideo Konishi, 2013. "Household Formation and Markets," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 821, Boston College Department of Economics.
  6. Konishi, Hideo, 2013. "Entrepreneurial land developers: Joint production, local externalities, and mixed housing developments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 68-79.

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