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Club Theory and Household Formation

The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi- member households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists of the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among house- holds where no group of consumers can benefit from forming a new household and valuation equilibria prove equivalent in the absence of consumption externalities, but not in their presence.

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File URL: http://www.cer.ethz.ch/research/WP-09-110.pdf
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Paper provided by CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich in its series CER-ETH Economics working paper series with number 09/110.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-110
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  1. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1988. "Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-49, February.
  2. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2005. "Consumption externalities, rental markets and purchase clubs," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 235-253, 01.
  3. Hideo Konishi, 2009. "Efficient Mixed Clubs: Nonlinear-Pricing Equilibria with Entrepreneurial Managers," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 710, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 08 Sep 2009.
  4. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  5. Gilles, Robert P. & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1997. "Decentralization in Replicated Club Economies with Multiple Private Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 363-387, February.
  6. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2009. "The affectionate society: does competition for partners promote friendliness?," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 389-403, September.
  7. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June.
  8. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R Zame, 2003. "Clubs and the Market," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000754, David K. Levine.
    • Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
  9. Donald A. Walker (ed.), 2000. "Equilibrium," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, volume 0, number 1585.
  10. Cole, Harold L. & Prescott, Edward C., 1997. "Valuation Equilibrium with Clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 19-39, May.
  11. Berglas, Eitan, 1976. "On the Theory of Clubs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 116-21, May.
  12. Bryan Ellickson and Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer, and William R.Zame., 1997. "Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies," Economics Working Papers 97-255, University of California at Berkeley.
  13. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
  14. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2009. "Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 665-690, November.
  15. Andreu Mas-Colell, 1980. "Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 94(4), pages 625-641.
  16. Ellickson, Bryan, 1979. "Competitive equilibrium with local public goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 46-61, August.
  17. Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 246-278, May.
  18. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2002. "Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation," Discussion Papers 02-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  19. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2001. "Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 347-368.
  20. Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882.
  21. Haller, Hans, 2000. "Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 835-47, November.
  22. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2004. "When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency," CESifo Working Paper Series 1197, CESifo Group Munich.
  23. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "A Tiebout theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 33-55, August.
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