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Club Theory and Household Formation

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Abstract

The relationship between our general equilibrium model with multi- member households and club models with multiple private goods is investigated. The main distinction in the definitions consists of the equilibrium concepts. As a rule, competitive equilibria among house- holds where no group of consumers can benefit from forming a new household and valuation equilibria prove equivalent in the absence of consumption externalities, but not in their presence.

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  • Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2009. "Club Theory and Household Formation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/110, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
  • Handle: RePEc:eth:wpswif:09-110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Haller, Hans, 2000. "Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 835-847, November.
    2. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2009. "Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(4), pages 665-690, November.
    3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
    4. Allouch, Nizar & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 246-278, May.
    5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2005. "When inefficiency begets efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 105-121.
    6. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1989. "A Tiebout theorem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 33-55, August.
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    8. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
    9. Ellickson, Bryan & Grodal, Birgit & Scotchmer, Suzanne & Zame, William R., 2001. "Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 40-77, November.
    10. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 1185-1218.
    11. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
    12. Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1988. "Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-49, February.
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    15. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-467, June.
    16. Gilles, Robert P. & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1997. "Decentralization in Replicated Club Economies with Multiple Private Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 363-387.
    17. Cole, Harold L. & Prescott, Edward C., 1997. "Valuation Equilibrium with Clubs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 19-39.
    18. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2005. "Consumption externalities, rental markets and purchase clubs," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 235-253.
    19. Hideo Konishi, 2010. "Efficient Mixed Clubs: Nonlinear-Pricing Equilibria With Entrepreneurial Managers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 35-63.
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    21. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "General Equilibrium with Multi-Member Households and Production," CESifo Working Paper Series 3659, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Balistreri, Edward J. & Hillberry, Russell H. & Rutherford, Thomas F., 2010. "Trade and welfare: Does industrial organization matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 85-87, November.
    3. Hideo Konishi, 2011. "Entrepreneurial Land Developers: Joint Production, Local Externalities, and Mixed Housing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 777, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 06 Apr 2013.
    4. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller & Hideo Konishi, 2015. "Household formation and markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 461-507.
    5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "Bargaining cum voice," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(2), pages 199-225, February.
    6. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2014. "Households, Markets and Public Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 4947, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Konishi, Hideo, 2013. "Entrepreneurial land developers: Joint production, local externalities, and mixed housing developments," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 68-79.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Household Behavior; Household Formation; General Equilibrium; Clubs;

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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