Decentralization in Replicated Club Economies with Multiple Private Goods
We show that exhaustion of blocking opportunities is a sufficient condition such that every allocation in the core of a replicated club economy can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium, and that a weaker condition efficient scale is a necessary condition such that any allocation in the core can be decentralized. Efficient scale is defined with respect to the economy as a whole, and not with respect to individual club sizes. These decentralization results do not require the Euclidean structure and monotonicity assumed in Lindahl equilibrium, do not require convexity of preferences or costs, and do not require the strong assumption that private goods are esssential.
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|Date of creation:||01 Oct 1995|
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