A premise of general equilibrium theory is that private goods are rival. Nevertheless, many private goods are shared, e.g., through barter, through co-ownership, or simply because one person’s consumption affects another person’s wellbeing. We analyze consumption externalities from the perspective of club theory, and argue that, provided consumption externalities are limited in scope, they can be internalized through membership fees to groups. Our main applications are to rental markets and “purchase clubs” in which members share the goods that they have individually purchased.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
03-25.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999.
"Clubs and the Market,"
Econometrica,
Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
Other versions:
Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999.
"Clubs and the Market,"
Discussion Papers
99-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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