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Digital Rights Management and the Pricing of Digital Products Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Yooki Park () (University of California, Berkeley)
Suzanne Scotchmer () (University of California, Berkeley)
Digital products such as movies, music and computer software are protected both by self-help measures such as encryption and copy controls, and by the legal right to prevent copying. We explore how digital rights management and other technical protections a®ect the pricing of content, and consequently, why content users, content vendors, and antitrust authorities might have di®erent views on what technical capabilities should be deployed. We discuss the potential for \collusion through technology."
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Paper provided by NET Institute in its series Working Papers with number
04-09.
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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 30 Sep 2004Date of revision:
Oct 2004Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:0409Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.NETinst.org/
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Nicholas Economides).
Keywords: technical protections ; DRM ; antitrust ; trusted systems ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
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