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Exit and Power in General Equilibrium

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  • Hans Gersbach
  • Hans Haller

Abstract

We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts of power and show that there is no monotonic relationship between these concepts. Then we examine existence of competitive equilibria with free exit and study whether maximal individual power is consistent with Pareto efficiency. As applications, we discuss when power spillovers occur and we identify human relation paradoxes: positiveexternalities increase, but none of the household members gains in equilibrium. We further identify implicit, determinate and de facto power.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2008/wp-cesifo-2008-08/cesifo1_wp2369.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 2369.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2369

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Related research

Keywords: group formation; competitive markets; power; exit;

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References

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  1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June.
  2. Haller, Hans, 2000. "Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 835-47, November.
  3. Apps, Patricia F & Rees, Ray, 1997. "Collective Labor Supply and Household Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 178-90, February.
  4. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2003. "Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation," CESifo Working Paper Series 953, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2001. "Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 347-68, April.
  7. Makowski, Louis & Ostroy, Joseph M. & Segal, Uzi, 1999. "Efficient Incentive Compatible Economies Are Perfectly Competitive," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(2), pages 169-225, April.
  8. Becker, Gary S, 1993. "Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 385-409, June.
  9. Bell, Clive, 1991. "Markets, power and productivity in rural Asia : A review article," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 373-393, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2009. "Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 665-690, November.

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