The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 45 (1977)
Issue (Month): 7 (October)
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