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Shlomo Weber

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This is information that was supplied by Shlomo Weber in registering through RePEc. If you are Shlomo Weber , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Shlomo
Middle Name:
Last Name: Weber
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pwe37

Email:
Homepage:
Postal Address: Department of Economics Southern Methodist University Dallas, TX 75275-0496
Phone: 214-768-3577

Affiliation

(50%) Department of Economics
Southern Methodist University
Location: Dallas, Texas (United States)
Homepage: http://www.smu.edu/economics/
Email:
Phone: (214) 768-3577
Fax: (214) 768-1821
Postal: P.O. Box 750496, Dallas, TX 75275-0496
Handle: RePEc:edi:desmuus (more details at EDIRC)
(50%) New Economic School (NES)
Location: Moscow, Russia
Homepage: http://www.nes.ru/
Email:
Phone: (7-495) 129-3722
Fax: (7-495) 129-1700
Postal: Nakhimovsky Pr. 47, Suite 1721, Moscow 117418
Handle: RePEc:edi:nerasru (more details at EDIRC)

Lists

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations or Wikipedia entries:
  1. Russian Federation Economists

Works

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Working papers

  1. Soubeyran, A. & Weber, A., 1999. "Localization of Activities: an Endogenous Geographical Choice," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 99a02, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  2. Rossell, M & Soubeyran, A. & Weber, S., 1996. "Stability of a Research Joint Venture," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 96a33, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  3. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a06, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  4. Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995. "Equivalence of Strong and Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria in Games without Spillovers," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a39, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  5. Le Breton, M. & Konishi, H. & Weber, S., 1995. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Game with Positive Externalities," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a40, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  6. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Strong Equilibrium in a Model with Partial Rivalry," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a07, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  7. Weber, S., 1992. "An Equilibrium in Electoral Competition with Entry Costs," Papers 92-5, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  8. Donnenfeld, S. & Weber, S., 1991. "Limit Qualities and Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-4, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  9. Breton,Michael Le & Weber,Shlomo, 1991. "A note on the Core and Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of simple games," Discussion Paper Serie A 332, University of Bonn, Germany.
  10. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1991. "A Note on the Core and von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions of Simple Games," Papers 91-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  11. Le Breton,Michel & Owen,Guillermo & Weber,Shlomo, 1991. "Strongly balanced cooperative games," Discussion Paper Serie A 338, University of Bonn, Germany.
  12. Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1991. "The Equivalence of Core and Lindahl Equilibria in an Economy with Semi-Public Goods," Discussion Paper Serie B 200, University of Bonn, Germany.
  13. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1991. "Stable Coalition Structures with Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Papers 9133, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  14. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1990. "On the Theory of Cost Sharing," Papers 90-10, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  15. Weber, S. & Kilgour, M. & Brams, S.J., 1990. "Sequential Arbitration Procedures," Papers 90-5, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  16. Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1990. "An Equivalence Result for the Core of an Economy with a Public Good," Discussion Paper Serie A 282, University of Bonn, Germany.
  17. Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1990. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions To The Nakamura Number," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 90a22, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  18. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1990. "Economic Models of NATO," Papers 90-7, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  19. Weber, S., 1990. "On Existence of a Fixed-Number Equilibrium in a Multiparty Electoral System," Papers 90-9, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  20. Weber,Shlomo, 1990. "On hierachical spatial competition," Discussion Paper Serie A 331, University of Bonn, Germany.
  21. Weber, S. & Appelbaum, E., 1990. "Precommitments and Probabilistic Entry Deterrence in Oligopoly," Papers 90-8, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  22. Appelbaum, E. & Weber, S., 1989. "Equilibrium Entry Patterns Under Uncertainty," Papers 89-11, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  23. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1989. "Burden Sharing in NATO: an Economic Analysis," Papers 90-4, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  24. Weber, S. & Wiesmeth, H., 1989. "An Economic Analysis Of Cooperation In The European Community," Papers 89-03, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  25. Donnenfeld, S. & Weber, S., 1989. "The Principle Of Maximal Product Differentiation," Papers 89-12, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  26. Greenberg, J. & Weber, S., 1989. "Coalition Formation With Eligibility," Papers 8901, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
  27. Shlomo Weber & Hans Wiesmeth, 1989. "The Theory of Cost Sharing," Discussion Paper Serie A 257, University of Bonn, Germany.
  28. Martin Shubik & Shlomo Weber, 1983. "A Note on the 'Corelessness' of Antibalance of a Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 678R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised 1984.
  29. Ginsburgh,Victor & MacLeod,Bentley & Weber,Shlomo, . "Price discrimination and product line rivalry," Discussion Paper Serie B 92, University of Bonn, Germany.

Articles

  1. Shlomo Weber, 1997. "Entry deterrence in electoral spatial competition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 31-56.
  2. Deb, Rajat & Weber, Shlomo & Winter, Eyal, 1996. "The Nakamura Theorem for Coalition Structures of Quota Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 189-98.
  3. Michel Le Breton & Hideo Konishi & Shlomo Weber, 1996. "Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 97-113.
  4. Hans Wiesmeth & Valery Vasil'ev & Shlomo Weber, 1995. "Core equivalence with congested public goods," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 373-387.
  5. Shabtai Donnenfeld & Shlomo Weber, 1995. "Limit Qualities and Entry Deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 113-130, Spring.
  6. Le Breton, M & Owen, G & Weber, S, 1992. "Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 419-27.
  7. Kirman, Alan P & Oddou, Claude & Weber, Shlomo, 1986. "Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(1), pages 129-38, January.
  8. Greenberg, Joseph & Weber, Shlomo, 1985. "Consistent d-Relative Majority Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 463-64, March.

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