Stability under Unanimous Consent, Free Mobility and Core
In this paper we consider an urban population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the real line that faces a problem of location and ﬁnancing of multiple public facilities. We examine three notions of stability of emerging jurisdiction: stability under unanimous consent, free mobility andcoreandprovideacharacterizationofstablepartitionsunder these notions of stability.
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