Endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 49 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552
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