This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Limit Qualities and Entry Deterrence

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Shabtai Donnenfeld
Shlomo Weber

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this article, we investigate how the interplay of competition among incumbents and the magnitude of a potential entrant's setup cost determines the configuration of the array of products to be offered in a perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that incumbents can use limit qualities to deter entry. We also demonstrate that rivalry among incumbents may lead to excessive entry deterrence. Our analysis generates predictions about the correlation between the degree of product differentiation and the size of the entrant's setup costs.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199521%2926%3A1%3C113%3ALQAED%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 26 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (Spring)
Pages: 113-130
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:spring:p:113-130

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org

Order Information:
Web: http://gemini.econ.umd.edu/cgi-bin/rje_online.cgi

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, 2006. "Vertical Differentiation: Multiproduct Strategy to Face Entry?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
  2. Mina Baliamoune & Stefan Lutz, 2009. "Preemption, Predation, and Minimum Quality Standards," ICER Working Papers 20-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. L. Lambertini, 1997. "Sequential versus Simultaneous Choice with Endogenous Quality: Comments and Extensions," Working Papers 294, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  4. L. Lambertini & C. Scarpa, 1999. "Minimum Quality Standards and Predatory Behaviour," Working Papers 353, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ralph Siebert, 1999. "The Impact of R&D Subsidies on the Introduction of New Products by Incumbent Firms
    old title -(New Product Introduction by Incumbent Firms)    ," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-19, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Aug 2003. [Downloadable!]
  6. Yong-Hwan Noh & GianCarlo Moschini, 2006. "Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp403, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Fabian Herweg, 2007. "Can price discrimination lead to product differentiation? A vertical differentiation model," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse2_2007, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  8. Reisinger, Markus, 2004. "Vertical Product Differentiation, Market Entry, and Welfare," Discussion Papers in Economics 479, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Siebert, Ralph, 2003. "The Impact of R&D Subsidies on the Introduction of New Products by Incumbent Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 4090, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Georg Götz, 2002. "Spatial Competition, Sequential Entry, and Technology choice," Vienna Economics Papers 0215, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Rajat Acharyya & Maria D.C. Garcia-Alonso, 2009. "Weak IPR and Imitation in the South and International Exhaustion of Patent Rights in the North for Innovated Drugs: A Policy Game," Studies in Economics 0919, Department of Economics, University of Kent. [Downloadable!]
  12. Lander Beloki & Jose María Usategui, 2005. "Vertical Differentiation and Entry Deterrence: A Reconsideration," DFAEII Working Papers 200506, University of the Basque Country - Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II. [Downloadable!]
  13. Luca Lambertini, 1995. "Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monoply," Working Papers 227, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  14. L. Lambertini & P. Tedeschi, 2000. "On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market," Working Papers 376, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Allard Made & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2009. "Entry Facilitation by Environmental Groups," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(4), pages 457-472, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. S Lutz, 2005. "Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0509, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  17. Shaoping Zhao, 1999. "Joint ventures for entry deterrence," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 25-35.
  18. L. Lambertini & P. Tedeschi, 2003. "Sequential Entry in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly," Working Papers 492, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  19. Ralph Siebert, 1999. "Credible Vertical Preemption," CIG Working Papers FS IV 99-20, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Jul 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Marcel Boyer & Philippe Mahenc & Michel Moreaux, 1995. "Entry Blockading Locations," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-51, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.