Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning
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Other versions of this item:
- Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a06, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
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- Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016.
"Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
- Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
- Ambec, Stefan & Kervinio, Yann, 2014. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," TSE Working Papers 14-480, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Desmet, Klaus & Le Breton, Michel & Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio, 2006.
"Nation Formation and Genetic Diversity,"
IDEI Working Papers
133, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- DESMET, Klaus & LE BRETON, Michel & ORTUNO-ORTIN, Ignacio & WEBER, Shlomo, 2006. "Nation formation and genetic diversity," CORE Discussion Papers 2006095, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Desmet, Klaus & Le Breton, Michel & Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio & Weber, Shlomo, 2006. "Nation Formation and Genetic Diversity," CEPR Discussion Papers 5918, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori, 2003. "Stable coalitions," Chapters,in: The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
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AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 2908-2917.
- Y. Braouezec, 2009. "Incomplete Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Market Partition Problem," Post-Print hal-00677781, HAL.
- Braouezec, Yann, 2016. "On the welfare effects of regulating the number of discriminatory prices," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 588-607.
- Michel Le Breton & Shlomo Weber, "undated".
"Stable Partitions in a Model with Group-Dependent Feasible Sets,"
03-24, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised May 2003.
- LE BRETON, Michel & WEBER, Shlomo, 2005. "Stable partitions in a model with group-dependent feasible sets," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1764, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Quint, Thomas, 1997. "Restricted houseswapping games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 451-470, May.
- Klaus Desmet & Michel Breton & Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín & Shlomo Weber, 2011.
"The stability and breakup of nations: a quantitative analysis,"
Journal of Economic Growth,
Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 183-213, September.
- Klaus Desmet & Michel Le Breton & Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Shlomo Weber, 2009. "The Stability and Breakup of Nations: A Quantitative Analysis," Working Papers VIVES Research Centre for Regional Economics 10, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, VIVES Research Centre for Regional Economics.
- Yann Braouezec, 2013. "The Welfare Effects of Regulating the Number of Market Segments," Working Papers 2013-ECO-11, IESEG School of Management.
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Keywordseconomic models ; economic analysis;
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