The Welfare Effects of Regulating the Number of Market Segments
Download full text from publisherTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
References listed on IDEAS
- Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994.
"Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
- Malueg, D.A. & Schwartz, M., 1993. "Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion and International Price Discrimination," Papers 93-6, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Yong He & Guang-Zhen Sun, 2006. "Income Dispersion And Price Discrimination," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 59-74, February.
- Belan, Pascal & Gauthier, Stéphane & Laroque, Guy, 2008.
"Optimal grouping of commodities for indirect taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 92(7), pages 1738-1750, July.
- Pascal Belan & Stéphane Gauthier & Guy Laroque, 2008. "Optimal grouping of commodities for indirect taxation," Post-Print hal-00731151, HAL.
- Le Grand, Julian, 1975. "Public Price Discrimination and Aid to Low Income Groups," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 42(165), pages 32-42, February.
- Phlips, Louis, 1988. " Price Discrimination: A Survey of the Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 135-167.
- Breton, M. le & Weber, S., 1992.
"Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning,"
93-6, York (Canada) - Department of Economics.
- Le Breton, M. & Weber, S., 1995. "Stability of Coalition Structures and the Principle of Optimal Partitioning," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 95a06, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1981.
"Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-247, March.
- Schmalensee, Richard., 1980. "Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination," Working papers 1095-80., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Braouezec, Yann, 2012.
"Customer-class pricing, parallel trade and the optimal number of market segments,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 605-614.
- Y. Braouezec, 2012. "Customer-class pricing, parallel trade and the optimal number of market segments," Post-Print hal-00788041, HAL.
- Iñaki Aguirre & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 2010.
"Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1601-1615, September.
- Aguirre Pérez, Iñaki & Cowan, Simon & Vickers, John, 2009. "Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature," IKERLANAK 2009-39, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
- Victor Kaftal & Debashis Pal, 2008. "Third Degree Price Discrimination in Linear-Demand Markets: Effects on Number of Markets Served and Social Welfare," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 558-573, October.
- Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-875, September.
- Steinberg, Richard & Weisbrod, Burton A., 2005. "Nonprofits with distributional objectives: price discrimination and corner solutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2205-2230, December.
- Hartwick, John M., 1978. "Optimal price discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 83-89, February.
- Maurice Salles, 2005. "Social Choice," Post-Print halshs-00337075, HAL.
- Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 1991. "Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination by a Regulated Monopolist," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 571-581, Winter.
More about this item
KeywordsEconomics; pricing; market segmentation; direct price discrimination; regulation;
- C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-07-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-07-20 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-07-20 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2013-07-20 (Regulation)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ies:wpaper:e201311. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Monika Marin). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/iesegfr.html .