Two incumbent parties choose their platforms in a unidimensional policy space while facing a credible threat of an entry by the third party. Relative electoral support is the predominant objective of each party, and the third party enters only if it can displace one of the incumbents. In an equilibrium the two incumbents choose to prevent the entry and achieve the balance of power, i.e., splitting the electorate equally. The incumbents' positions might diverge more as compared to a system in which the parties seek to solely maximize the voters' support. Therefore, rank preoccupation under the threat of entry might contribute to more polarized political platforms of the two leading parties.
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
2005056.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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