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District formation: a co-opetition approach

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  • SOUBEYRAN, Antoine
  • WEBER, Shlomo

Abstract

This paper considers a model of district formation that incorporates a notion of regional industrial systems. Each firm chooses its location from the set of existing industrial districts. The heterogeneous firms are distinguished by its "stand alone" district-dependent production and transportation cost. However, if other firms locate in the same district, the firm's stand alone cost is reduced by a factor that depends on the number of firms in the district. Thus, firms must take into account the reciprocal nature of cost-reduction as by joining a district, they engage in tacit cooperation: the firms reduce their own costs but in the same time reduce the costs of their rivals. We show that under quite general assumptions this co-opetition game that contains the elements of competition and cooperation, yields a subgame perfect equilibrium for any number of firms and districts. We characterize both "agglomeration" equilibria, where all firms locate in the same district, and "dispersed" equilibria, where firms locate in different districts. We show that a dispersed equilibrium can emerge only if firms' and districts' characteristics possess a sufficient degree of heterogeneity.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2001016.

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Date of creation: 00 Mar 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001016

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Related research

Keywords: industrial districts; cost reduction factor; agglomeration and dispersed equilibria;

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References

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  1. SOUBEYRAN, Antoine & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Learning-by-doing and the development of industrial districts," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1366, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Belleflamme, Paul & Picard, Pierre & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 2000. "An Economic Theory of Regional Clusters," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 158-184, July.
  3. Long, N.V. & Soubeyran, A., 1998. "Cost Manipulation in an Asymmetric Oligopoly: The Taxation Problem," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 98a25, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  4. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  5. Ngo Van Long & Antoine Soubeyran, 1999. "Cost Manipulation Games in Oligopoly, with Costs of Manipulating," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-13, CIRANO.
  6. Slade, M.E., 1989. "What Does An Oligopoly Maximize?," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 89a14, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
  7. Konishi, Hideo & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 1997. "Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Group Formation Game with Positive Externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 161-182, October.
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