This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores (revised version)

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jean-Marc Bonnisseau ()
Vincent Iehlé ()

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows the selection of specific core payoff vectors. Lastly, the class of parametrized cooperative games is introduced. This new setting and its associated equilibrium-core solution extend the usual cooperative game framework and core solution to situations depending on an exogenous environment. A non-emptiness result for the equilibrium-core is also provided in the context of a parametrized cooperative game. Our proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2007/67807.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 678.07.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 34
Date of creation: 22 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:678.07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Xavier Vila).

Related research
Keywords: balancedness; cooperative game; core; parametrized game;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - General
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1996. "The Partnered Core of an Economy and the Partnered Competitive Equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 143-152, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kajii, Atsushi, 1992. "A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An [alpha]-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 194-205, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Florenzano Monique, 1987. "On the non-emptiness of the core of a coalitional production economy without ordered preferences," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8733, CEPREMAP.
  4. Serrano, Roberto & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi, 2006. "A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 288-301, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Boehm, Volker, 1974. "The Core of an Economy with Production," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(3), pages 429-36, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Border, Kim C, 1984. "A Core Existence Theorem for Games without Ordered Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1537-42, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Shapley, Lloyd & Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "On Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem, the K-K-M-S Theorem and the Core of a Balanced Game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 108-16, January.
  8. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1998. "An extension of the KKMS theorem," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 125-134, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(42), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Yakar Kannai & Wooders, Myrna H., 1999. "A Further Extension of the KKMS Theorem," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 538, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Ichiishi, Tatsuro, 1981. "A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 369-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Cornet, Bernard, 1988. "Existence of equilibria when firms follow bounded losses pricing rules," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 119-147, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  16. Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Quinzii, Martine, 1983. "Decentralization for the Core of a Production Economy with Increasing Returns," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 397-412, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Predtetchinski, Arkadi & Jean-Jacques Herings, P., 2004. "A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 84-92, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Monique Florenzano, 2008. "General equilibrium," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne b08005, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Orshan, Gooni & Zarzuelo, Jose M., 2000. "The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel for NTU Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 67-84, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Bonnisseau, J.M., 1995. "Existence of Equilibria in Economies with Externalities and Non Convexities," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 95.45, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  21. Roy Radner & Tatsuro Ichiishi, 1999. "A profit-center game with incomplete information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 307-343. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Vohra, Rajiv, 1988. "On the existence of equilibria in economies with increasing returns," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 179-192, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam, 1996. "Bayesian Cooperative Choice of Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 455-73.
  24. Reny, Philip J. & Holtz Wooders, Myrna, 1996. "The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 298-311, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. P. Herings & Gerard Laan & Dolf Talman, 2007. "Socially Structured Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 1-29, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Herbert E. Scarf, 1970. "On the Existence of a Cooperative Solution for a General Class of N-Person Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 293, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.