Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games
AbstractDifferent kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations; in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in : the partnered core, the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003) that states the existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting the core.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number b04093.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2004
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Cooperative games; dependent balancedness; core selections in NTU games.;
Other versions of this item:
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(42), pages 1-10.
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games," Game Theory and Information 0411001, EconWPA.
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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