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Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores

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Author Info

  • Jean-Marc Bonnisseau

    (University Paris 1, Cermsem)

  • Vincent Iehle

    (University Paris 1, Cermsem)

Abstract

We provide a result for non-emptiness of the core in NTU games. We use a payoffs-dependent balancedness condition, based on transfer rate mappings. Going beyond the non-emptiness of standard core, existence of some refined solution is proved, including specific core allocations and equilibrium-core allocations in parameterized collection of cooperative games. The proofs borrow mathematical tools and geometric constructions from general equilibrium theory with non convexities. Applications to various extant results taken from game theory and economic theory are given.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0403/0403004.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0403004.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 28 Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0403004

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 32
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Cooperative games; Core solutions; Non-emptiness;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(42), pages 1-10.
  2. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00197528 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Vincent Iehlé, 2009. "Sustainability In A Multiproduct And Multiple Agent Contestable Market," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 151-164, 04.
  4. Vincent Iehlé, 2005. "The core-partition of hedonic games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05091, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  5. Nizar Allouch & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2008. "On the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 203-210, June.
  6. Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "The core-partition of a hedonic game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 176-185, September.
  7. Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 888-906, July.
  8. Liu, Jiuqiang & Liu, Xiaodong, 2013. "A necessary and sufficient condition for an NTU fuzzy game to have a non-empty fuzzy core," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 150-156.
  9. Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b05023, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

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