Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games
AbstractWe prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) in its series Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques with number b05023.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
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Cooperative games; contestable markets; sustainability; subsidy free; parameterized cost games.;
Other versions of this item:
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00193961, HAL.
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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- Baumol, William J & Bailey, Elizabeth E & Willig, Robert D, 1977. "Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 350-65, June.
- Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-77, December.
- ten Raa, Thijs, 1983. "Supportability and anonymous equity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 176-181, October.
- Jean-Marc Bonnisseau & Vincent Iehle, 2004.
"Payoffs-dependent Balancedness and Cores,"
Game Theory and Information
- Raa, M.H. ten, 1983. "Supportability and anonymous equity," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-382067, Tilburg University.
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