Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Sustainability in a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market

Contents:

Author Info

  • Iehlé, Vincent

Abstract

We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Our results suggest that the existence results of the extant literature admit analogues even in an environment where rivals have enlarged possibilities to enter the market and where demands react to prices. The approach makes use of cooperative games to deduce the main results under conditions of fair sharing cost, threshold in the consumption and regularity of the profit function.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13013/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 13013.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13013

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: cooperative game; existence result; natural monopoly; subsidy free pricing; sustainability;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Leonard J. Mirman & Yair Tauman & Israel Zang, 1985. "Supportability, Sustainability, and Subsidy-Free Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 114-126, Spring.
  2. Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc & Iehle, Vincent, 2007. "Payoff-dependent balancedness and cores," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 1-26, October.
  3. Baumol, William J & Bailey, Elizabeth E & Willig, Robert D, 1977. "Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 350-65, June.
  4. Sharkey, William W. & Sibley, David S., 1993. "Optimal non-linear pricing with regulatory preference over customer type," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 197-229, February.
  5. ten Raa, Thijs, 1983. "Supportability and anonymous equity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 176-181, October.
  6. Spulber, Daniel F., 1984. "Scale economies and existence of sustainable monopoly prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 149-163, October.
  7. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, 1977. "Free Entry and the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 1-22, Spring.
  8. Faulhaber, Gerald R, 1975. "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 966-77, December.
  9. Thijs ten Raa, 1984. "Resolution of Conjectures on the Sustainability of Natural Monopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 135-141, Spring.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:13013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.