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Réglementation et concurrence : quelques éléments de théorie économique

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  • David Encaoua

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[fre] Réglementation et concurrence : quelques éléments de théorie économique, par David Encaoua.. . Ce document présente des éléments de théorie économique permettant d'éclairer le débat autour du thème de la déréglementation économique. L'accent est mis sur les situations de concurrence inefficace ou/et impraticable qui sont censées caractériser le fonctionnement de nombreuses activités : télécommunications, transports aériens, transports routiers... Jusqu'au milieu des années 1960, il était traditionnellement admis que les défaillances des mécanismes de marché dues à ces imperfections de la concurrence justifiaient une régulation par les pouvoirs publics en termes de contrôle des prix et de la structure de l'offre. Mais à partir de cette date, de nombreuses critiques sont apparues aux Etats-Unis, mettant l'accent soit sur les défaillances des processus réglementaires eux-mêmes, soit sur le caractère erroné des prémisses à partir desquelles se justifiait la réglementation. . . Le document développe plus précisément ce deuxième type de critiques en analysant la théorie des marchés contestables qui se présente comme un nouveau paradigme d'analyse de la concurrence. La question centrale qui est traitée est alors la suivante : l'existence d'une menace d'entrée de concurrents potentiels et le dépassement des frontières d'activités définissant un monopole naturel suivant l'apparition de nouvelles technologies peuvent-elles, créer une pression suffisante pour que la régulation par les forces du marché conduise à des résultats collectivement satisfaisants ? La situation du monopole naturel multi- produits ne comportant pas de coûts fixes irréversibles est examinée en détail, notamment à travers le problème de l'allocation des coûts. . . La dernière partie du texte a pour objet d'examiner dans quelle mesure les expériences récentes de déréglementation aux Etats-Unis se sont avérées conformes aux prédictions de la théorie des marchés contestables, en analysant les situations respectives des transports aériens et des télécommunications. [eng] Regulation and competition: some elements of economic theory, by David Encaoua.. . This paper presents elements of economic theory which shed some light on the debate surrounding deregulation of some industries. It deals in particular with the cases of activities where competition is considered to be inefficient and/or impracticable: telecommunications, air and road transport... Until the midsixties it was tradtionally accepted that the flaws in market mechanisms which resulted from these weaknesses in competition justified a measure of government regulation in terms of controls on prices and on supply structures. Since then, however, this notion has come in for a certain amount of criticism, mainly in the United States, the critics arguing either that the mechanisms of regulation themselves are faulty or that the basic premise justifying the regulation of economic forces by the State is no more true. . . The paper goes on to examine this latter type of argument by analysing the theory of contestable markets, which has come to be a new paradigm in analysing competition. The central issue is thus the following: can the threat of potential competitors entering the market and new technologies breaching boundaries of activity which form natural monopolies actually exert sufficient pressure for free market forces to lead to results which are satisfactory all round ? The situation of the natural multi-product monopoly which entails no sunk costs is examined in detail, in particular in terms of the cost allocation problem. . . Finally, the paper examines to what extent the recent deregulation experiments in the United States confirm the predictions of the contestable market theory by studying the cases of the air transport and telecommunications industries. . . JEL : Classification number 612

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  • David Encaoua, 1986. "Réglementation et concurrence : quelques éléments de théorie économique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 76(5), pages 7-46.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1986_hos_76_5_6011
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1986.6011
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1986.6011
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    8. Morrison, Steven A & Winston, Clifford, 1985. "Intercity Transportation Route Structures under Deregulation: Some Assessments Motivated by the Airline Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 57-61, May.
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    10. Gunter Knieps & Ingo Vogelsang, 1982. "The Sustainability Concept under Alternative Behavioral Assumptions," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 234-241, Spring.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Marc Siroën, 1993. "Marchés contestables, différenciation des produits et discrimination des prix," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(3), pages 569-592.
    2. Jacques Kiambu, 2008. "Concurrence dans les réseaux et incompatibilité technologique (Competition in networks and technological incompatibility)," Working Papers 179, Laboratoire de Recherche sur l'Industrie et l'Innovation. ULCO / Research Unit on Industry and Innovation.
    3. Jean-Jacques Santini, 1986. "Les dénationalisations britanniques : objectifs et réalisations," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 76(5), pages 47-69.
    4. David Encaoua & Michel Moreaux, 1987. "L'analyse théorique des problèmes de tarification et d'allocation des coûts dans les télécommunications," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(2), pages 375-414.
    5. François Legendre, 1992. "La distribution des rendements d'échelle dans l'industrie. Une illustration à partir d'un panel de plus de 700 entreprises françaises," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(1), pages 71-100.
    6. David Encaoua & Philippe Koebel, 1987. "Réglementation et déréglementation des télécommunications : leçons anglo-saxonnes et perspectives d'évolution en France," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(2), pages 475-520.
    7. Omar Aouah & Iliass El Badaoui, 2018. "Governance Practices And The Performance Of Establishments And Companies In Morocco: Proposal For A Theoretical Model [Les Pratiques De Gouvernance Et La Performance Des Etablissements Et Entrepris," Working Papers halshs-01956777, HAL.

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