Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games
AbstractDifferent kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts of robustness. Within a unified approach, we deduce the existence of allocations in: the partnered core, the social stable core, the core intersected with average prekernel, the weak inner core. We use a recent contribution of Bonnisseau and Iehlé (2003) that states the existence of core allocations with a transfer rate rule equilibrium under a dependent balancedness assumption. It shall turn out to be manipulable tools for selecting the core.
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Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 02 Nov 2004
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Cooperative games; dependent balancedness; core selections in NTU games.;
Other versions of this item:
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(42), pages 1-10.
- Iehlé, Vincent, 2004. "Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/86, Paris Dauphine University.
- Vincent Iehlé, 2004. "Transfer rate rules and core selections in NTU games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b04093, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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