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Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core

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Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003-21.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-21

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June.
  2. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Forges, Françoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "A note on the incentive compatible core," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/5452, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. FORGES , Françoise, 1993. "A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1993043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Oscar Volij, 1998. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij 006, Oscar Volij, revised 15 Sep 1999.
  6. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
  8. Ichiishi, T. & Sertel, M.R., 1997. "Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists) 161, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
  9. Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June.
  10. Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September.
  11. ALLEN, Beth, 1992. "Incentives in market games with asymmetric information: The core," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1992021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  13. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  14. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  15. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  16. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June.
  17. Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam, 1996. "Bayesian Cooperative Choice of Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 455-73.
  18. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  19. Roy Radner & Tatsuro Ichiishi, 1999. "A profit-center game with incomplete information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 307-343.
  20. Forges, Françoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/169, Paris Dauphine University.
  21. Martine Quinzii, 1982. "Core and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 644, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  22. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 262-270, October.
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