Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm
AbstractAt an interim stage players possessing only their private information freely communicate with each other to coordinate their strategies. This results in a core strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players' alternative type-contingent contract offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action, thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. Now with new information thus obtained from each other, the players play a new game to re-write their contract. In all of the optimization and gaming just described, Bayesian incentive compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler's multidivisional firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ohio State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 012.
Date of creation: Apr 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Tatsuro Ichiishi & Murat R. Sertel, 1998. "Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 523-543.
- Ichiishi, T. & Sertel, M.R., 1997. "Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 161, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
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- NEP-ALL-1999-02-08 (All new papers)
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