Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm
AbstractThe present paper proposes new concepts and a new scenario with which to analyze cooperative interim contracting and re-contracting in an organization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ohio State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 012.
Date of creation: Apr 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- Tatsuro Ichiishi & Murat R. Sertel, 1998. "Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 523-543.
- Ichiishi, T. & Sertel, M.R., 1997. "Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 161, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1999-02-08 (All new papers)
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- FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001.
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- Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
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