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Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information

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  • Oscar Volij

    (Brown University)

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    Abstract

    We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core is introduced, that requires credibility from the improvements.

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    File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/9711/9711001.ps.gz
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9711001.

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    Length: 17 pages
    Date of creation: 22 Nov 1997
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711001

    Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on PC-TEX; pages: 17
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    Web page: http://128.118.178.162

    Related research

    Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Core; Common Knowledge;

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    1. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
    3. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. John Geanakoplos & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1982. "We Can't Disagree Forever," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 639, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    5. Stefan KRASA, 1997. "Efficiency with Incomplete Information," Vienna Economics Papers vie9707, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    6. Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman, 2004. "Market Crashes without External Shocks," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(1), pages 1-8, January.
    7. Paul Milgrom & Nancy L.Stokey, 1979. "Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers 377R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    9. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    10. Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Credible Coalitions and the Core," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 185-87.
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