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Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version

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Author Info

  • Qingmin Liu

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Columbia University)

  • George J. Mailath

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Andrew Postlewaite

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

  • Larry Samuelson

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Yale University)

Abstract

We formulate a notion of stable outcomes in matching problems with one-sided asymmetric information. The key conceptual problem is to formulate a notion of a blocking pair that takes account of the inferences that the uninformed agent might make. We show that the set of stable outcomes is nonempty in incomplete-information environments, and is a superset of the set of complete-information stable outcomes. We then provide sufficient conditions for incomplete-information stable matchings to be efficient. Lastly, we define a notion of price-sustainable allocations and show that the set of incomplete-information stable matchings is a subset of the set of such allocations.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 13-028.

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Length: 73 pages
Date of creation: 26 Aug 2012
Date of revision: 17 Jun 2013
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:13-028

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Keywords: Matching; Stability; Stable outcome; Incomplete information; Core;

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References

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  1. Forges Francoise, 1994. "Posterior Efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 238-261, March.
  2. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
  3. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Stephan Lauermann & Georg Nöldeke, 2012. "Stable Marriages and Search Frictions," Working papers 2012/10, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  5. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
  6. Chakraborty, Archishman & Citanna, Alessandro & Ostrovsky, Michael, 2010. "Two-sided matching with interdependent values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 85-105, January.
  7. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2005. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," NBER Working Papers 11765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection," Discussion Papers 767, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Ehlers, Lars & Masso, Jordi, 2007. "Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 587-600, September.
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