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Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games

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  • Roberto Serrano

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  • Rajiv Vohra

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Abstract

A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which the transmission of information among members of a coalition is endogenous. Our results lend support to the credible core of Dutta and Vohra [4] and the core proposed by Myerson [11] as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting

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Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we055726.

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Date of creation: Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we055726

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  1. Volij, Oscar, 2000. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 5140, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May.
  3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
  4. Qin Cheng-Zhong, 1993. "The Inner Core and the Strictly Inhibitive Set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 96-106, February.
  5. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Non-cooperative implementation of the core," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 513-525.
  6. Volij, Oscar & Lee, Darin, 2000. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 5193, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-97, November.
  8. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
  9. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Myerson, Roger B., 2007. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 260-285, September.
  11. Perry, Motty & Reny, Philip J, 1994. "A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 795-817, July.
  12. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  13. DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, . "Two remarks on the inner core," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -1763, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  15. FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Cramton, Peter C. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1990. "Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 731, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  17. Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Cited by:
  1. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2009. "Equilibrium blocking in large quasilinear economies," Working Papers, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales 2009-12, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  2. Francoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems," Working Papers 2011-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  3. Okada, Akira, 2009. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Information Core," Discussion Papers 2009-16, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  4. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Stable Matching with Incomplete Information, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-042, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 28 Oct 2012.
  6. Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2008-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Kamishiro, Yusuke, 2011. "Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 513-520, March.

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