The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game
AbstractWe consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik. We prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 47 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
Other versions of this item:
- Forges, Françoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/169, Paris Dauphine University.
- F. Forges, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game," THEMA Working Papers 2002-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-41, November.
- Forges, Françoise, 2005. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/167, Paris Dauphine University.
- Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001.
"Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core,"
2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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