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The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game

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Author Info
Forges, Francoise

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 47 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 135-151
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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:135-151

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  1. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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