Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core

Author Info

Vohra, Rajiv

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Rajiv Vohra

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 86 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 123-147
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:86:y:1999:i:1:p:123-147

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Paper
- Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
- Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers 0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
- Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 519, Econometric Society.
- Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tatsuro Ichiishi & Semih Koray, 1999. "Job Matching: A Multi-Principal, Multi-Agent Model," Working Papers 99-14, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Oscar Volij, 1997. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information 9711001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
EINY, Ezra & HAIMANKO, Ori & ORZACH, Ram & SELA, Aner, 2001. "Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information," CORE Discussion Papers 2001007, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies," Working Papers 2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008. "Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies," Working Papers 2008-5, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007. "Private information, transferable utility,and the core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0703, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- S D Flåm & L Koutsougeras, 2005. "Private Information, Transferable Utility, and the Core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0512, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Oscar Volij & Darin Lee, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Game Theory and Information 9706002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory 005, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
- Volij, Oscar & Lee, Darin, 2002. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Staff General Research Papers 5193, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Richard McLean & Andrew Postlewaite, 2003. "Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-027, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- McLean, Richard & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2005. "Core convergence with asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 58-78, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
FORGES, Franoise & MERTENS, Jean-Franois & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," CORE Discussion Papers 2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- FORGES, Franoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.