Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information
AbstractWe analyze the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (1) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (2) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities and a comparison and interpretation of all of these core notions is provided.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 3 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
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