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Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information

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Author Info
Koutsougeras, Leonidas C
Yannelis, Nicholas C
Abstract

We analyze the coarse, the fine, and the private core allocation of an exchange economy with differential information. The basic questions that we address are whether the above concepts are: (1) coalitionally incentive compatible, i.e., does truthful revelation of information in each coalition occur; and (2) taking into account the information superiority or information advantage of an agent. Moreover, the above three concepts are examined in the presence of externalities and a comparison and interpretation of all of these core notions is provided.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 3 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 195-216
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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:3:y:1993:i:2:p:195-216

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  1. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & V. Martins-da-Rocha & Paulo Monteiro, 2009. "Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 295-320, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Wassim Daher & V. Martins-da-Rocha & Yiannis Vailakis, 2007. "Asset market equilibrium with short-selling and differential information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 425-446, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Claudia Meo, 2009. "Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 371-383, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Glycopantis, Dionysius & Muir, Allan & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2004. "Non-implementation of Rational Expectations as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium," Economics Series 148, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Dionysius Glycopantis & Allan Muir & Nicholas Yannelis, 2009. "On non-revealing rational expectations equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 351-369, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Oscar Volij & Darin Lee, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Game Theory and Information 9706002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Martins-da-Rocha, V. F. & Angeloni, Laura, 2008. "Large economies with differential information but without free disposal," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 671, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  9. FORGES, Franoise & MERTENS, Jean-Franois & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," CORE Discussion Papers 2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  10. FORGES, Franoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  11. Laura Angeloni & V. Martins-da-Rocha, 2009. "Large economies with differential information and without free disposal," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 263-286, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Angeloni, Laura & Martins-da-Rocha, V. F., 2007. "Contract enforcement and incentive compatibility in large economies with differential information: the role of exact feasibility," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 647, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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