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The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach

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  • Lee, Darin
  • Volij, Oscar

Abstract

We propose two generalizations of the Davis and Maschler (1965) reduced game property to economies with asymmetric information and apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (2002)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (September)
Pages: 43-63

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Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:38:y:2002:i:1-2:p:43-63

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References

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  1. Oscar Volij, 1997. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9711001, EconWPA.
  2. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
  3. John Geanakoplos, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall.
  4. Lee, Darin, 1998. "A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 203-208, November.
  5. Serrano, Roberto & Volij, Oscar, 1998. "Axiomatizations of neoclassical concepts for economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 87-108, August.
  6. Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1993. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research 9306, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  7. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
  8. Nalebuff, Barry, 1989. "The Other Person's Envelope Is Always Greener," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 171-81, Winter.
  9. Kobayashi, Takao, 1980. "Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1635-65, November.
  10. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  11. van den Nouweland, A. & Peleg, B. & Tijs, S., 1996. "Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 355-372.
  12. Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  13. Guangsug Hahn & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 1997. "Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 383-411.
  14. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July.
  15. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 183-97, April.
  16. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
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Cited by:
  1. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
  2. S. Flåm & L. Koutsougeras, 2010. "Private information, transferable utility, and the core," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 591-609, March.
  3. Forges, Françoise & Mertens, Jean-François & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/5454, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society 519, Econometric Society.
  5. Okada, Akira, 2012. "Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1165-1190.
  6. Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  8. Lee, Darin, 1998. "A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 203-208, November.

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