1. Oscar Volij, 2000. "Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 63-79. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kahn, C.M. & Mookherjee, D., 1991. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Advese Selection Insurance Economy," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 91-5, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
3. F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1999. "A note on the incentive compatible core," THEMA Working Papers 99-02, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
   Other versions:
   • Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 2001. "A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 179-188, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. F. Forges, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game," THEMA Working Papers 2002-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Forges, Francoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 135-151, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
8. Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility, and the Core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 123-147, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
9. Volij, Oscar & Lee, Darin, 2002. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Staff General Research Papers 5193, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Oscar Volij & Darin Lee, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Game Theory and Information 9706002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Darin Lee & Oscar Volij, 1997. "The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach," Economic theory and game theory 005, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
   • Lee, Darin & Volij, Oscar, 2002. "The core of economies with asymmetric information: an axiomatic approach," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 43-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Einy, Ezra & Moreno, Diego & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2000. "On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 262-270, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Forges, Francoise, 1994. "A note on Pareto optimality in differential information economies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 27-31, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Forges, F., 1993. "A Note on Pareto Optimality in Differential Information Economies," Papers 9343, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.
12. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers 5140, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
14. Ichiishi, Tatsuro & Idzik, Adam, 1996. "Bayesian Cooperative Choice of Strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 455-73.
15. Tatsuro Ichiishi & Murat R. Sertel, 1998. "Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 523-543. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ichiishi, T. & Sertel, M.R., 1997. "Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica 161, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists).
    • Tatsuro Ichiishi & Murat R. Sertel, 1996. "Cooperative Interim Contract and Re-Contract: Chandler's M-Form Firm," Working Papers 012, Ohio State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
16. Oscar Volij, 1998. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Economic theory and game theory 006, Oscar Volij, revised 15 Sep 1999. [Downloadable!]
17. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
18. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Wilson, Robert B, 1978. "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(4), pages 807-16, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Martine Quinzii, 1982. "Core and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 644, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
22. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Forges, F. & Mertens, J.-F. & Vohra, R., 2001. "The Ex Ante incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects," Papers 0101, Catholique de Louvain - Center for Operations Research and Economics.

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1. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Economics Working Papers 0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Rajiv Vohra & Roberto Serrano, 2004. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 519, Econometric Society.
   • Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2007. "Information transmission in coalitional voting games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 117-137, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Correlated Equilibria, Incomplete Information and Coalitional Deviations," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 763, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
3. Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
4. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Oscar Volij, 1997. "Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information," Game Theory and Information 9711001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]