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On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information

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The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main differential information economies studied in the literature. The analysis is further extended by allowing the presence of large traders, which may cause the lack of perfect competition.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 303.

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Date of creation: 11 Jan 2012
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Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:303

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Keywords: Mixed markets; fairness; envy; efficiency; asymmetric information;

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  1. Greenberg, Joseph & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 1986. "A simple proof of the equivalence theorem for oligopolistic mixed markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 79-83, April.
  2. Maria Laura Pesce, 2011. "Are Asymmetrically Informed Agents Envious?," CSEF Working Papers 292, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  3. Allen, Beth E, 1981. "Generic Existence of Completely Revealing Equilibria for Economies with Uncertainty when Prices Convey Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1173-99, September.
  4. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004. "Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2004-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  5. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Emma Moreno-García & Nicholas Yannelis, 2005. "Characterization and incentive compatibility of Walrasian expectations equilibrium in infinite dimensional commodity spaces," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 361-381, 08.
  6. Marialaura Pesce, 2010. "On mixed markets with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 23-53, October.
  7. Kobayashi, Takao, 1980. "Equilibrium Contracts for Syndicates with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(7), pages 1635-65, November.
  8. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2001. "Competitive and core allocations in large economies with differential information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 321-332.
  9. Radner, Roy, 1979. "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 655-78, May.
  10. De Simone, Anna & Graziano, Maria Gabriella, 2003. "Cone conditions in oligopolistic market models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-73, February.
  11. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2007. "The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 144-158, July.
  12. Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold, 1975. "Coalitional Fairness of Allocations in Pure Exchange Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(4), pages 661-68, July.
  13. Thibault Gajdos & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2002. "Fairness under Uncertainty," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00086032, HAL.
  14. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2002:i:18:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Palfrey, Thomas R & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1987. "On Bayesian Implementable Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 193-208, April.
  16. Lin Zhou, 1991. "Strictly Fair Allocations in Large Exchange Economies," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 972, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  17. Chiara Donnini & Maria Gabriella Graziano & Maria Laura Pesce, 2010. "Fairness Properties of Constrained Market Equilibria," CSEF Working Papers 245, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
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