On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information
AbstractThe paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main differential information economies studied in the literature. The analysis is further extended by allowing the presence of large traders, which may cause the lack of perfect competition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 303.
Date of creation: 11 Jan 2012
Date of revision:
Mixed markets; fairness; envy; efficiency; asymmetric information;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-01-25 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-01-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-01-25 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-01-25 (Microeconomics)
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