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Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Rajiv Vohra
Roberto Serrano
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A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information sharing is generally implicit in the equilibria of such voting games, this approach makes it possible to derive core concepts in which information sharing is endogenous. Our results lend support to credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2003) and the core proposed by Myerson (2003) as two that can be justified in terms of coalitional voting
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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number
519.
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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:519Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Core ; Incomplete Information ; Coalitional Voting ; Resilience ; Mediation ; Other versions of this item:
Article Paper Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005.
"Information Transmission In Coalitional Voting Games ,"
Economics Working Papers
we055726, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005.
"Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games ,"
Economics Working Papers
0050, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
[Downloadable!] Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005.
"Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games ,"
Working Papers
2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001.
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Other versions:
Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001.
"The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects ,"
Working Papers
2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] FORGES, Franoise & MERTENS, Jean-Franois & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001.
"The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
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Geoffroy de Clippel, 2004.
"The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information ,"
Working Papers
2004-18, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Yusuke Kamishiro & Roberto Serrano, 2008.
"Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies ,"
Working Papers
2008-01, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
[Downloadable!]
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