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The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach

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Author Info
Oscar Volij (Brown University)
Darin Lee (Brown University)

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Abstract

We propose two generalizations of the Davis Maschler reduced game property to economies with asymmetric information and apply them in the characterization of two solution concepts. One is Wilson's (1978) Coarse Core and the other is a subsolution of it which we call the Coarse+ Core.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9706002.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 13 Jun 1997
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9706002

Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript level 2/600dpi; pages: 30 ; figures: none
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Related research
Keywords: Core; asymmetric information; consistency; reduced economy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Guangsug Hahn & Nicholas C. Yannelis, 1997. "Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 383-411. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nalebuff, Barry, 1989. "The Other Person's Envelope Is Always Greener," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 171-81, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1991. "The Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 183-97, April.
  4. Rajiv Vohra, 1997. "Incomplete Information, Incentive Compatibility and the Core," Working Papers 97-11, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  5. Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Axiomatizations of Neoclassical Concepts for Economies," Staff General Research Papers 5192, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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  6. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Thomson, W., 1996. "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers 418, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  8. Geanakoplos, John, 1992. "Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 53-82, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Koutsougeras, Leonidas C & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1993. "Incentive Compatibility and Information Superiority of the Core of an Economy with Differential Information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 195-216, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2005. "Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games," Working Papers 2005-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007. "Private information, transferable utility,and the core," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0703, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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