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A note on the incentive compatible core Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics F. Forges
E. Minelli
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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number
99-02.
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Date of creation: 1999Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:99-02Contact details of provider: Postal: 33, boulevard du port - 95011 Cergy-Pontoise Cedex Phone: 33 1 34 25 60 63 Fax: 33 1 34 25 62 33 Email: Web page: http://www.u-cergy.fr/thema More information through EDIRC
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Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Beth Allen, 2006.
"Market games with asymmetric information: the core ,"
Economic Theory ,
Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
FORGES, Franoise & MERTENS, Jean-Franois & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001.
"The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001.
"The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects ,"
Working Papers
2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002.
"The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Françoise Forges, 2006.
"Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments ,"
Social Choice and Welfare ,
Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 403-419, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Francoise Forges, 2006.
"The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!]
Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000.
"Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey ,"
Working Papers
2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
FORGES, Franoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001.
"Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!] Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002.
"Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey ,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) S. D. Flåm. & L. Koutsougeras, 2007.
"Private information, transferable utility,and the core ,"
The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series
0703, Economics, The University of Manchester.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001.
"Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core ,"
Working Papers
2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003.
"Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core ,"
Working Papers
2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005.
"Incomplete information, credibility and the core ,"
Mathematical Social Sciences ,
Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.
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