The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game

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The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game

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F. Forges

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Francoise Forges

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2002-07.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2002-07

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Article
- Forges, Francoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 135-151, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv, 2005. "Incomplete information, credibility and the core," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 148-165, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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