The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core of the Assignment Game
AbstractWe consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik. We prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2002-07.
Date of creation: 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- Forges, Francoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 135-151, March.
- Forges, Françoise, 2004. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/169, Paris Dauphine University.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Rajiv Vohra & Bhaskar Dutta, 2003.
"Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core,"
2003-21, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Francoise Forges, 2006. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities," CESifo Working Paper Series 1686, CESifo Group Munich.
- Forges, Françoise, 2005. "The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with and without indivisibilities," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University 123456789/167, Paris Dauphine University.
- M. Bumin Yenmez, 2013. "Incentive-Compatible Matching Mechanisms: Consistency with Various Stability Notions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 120-41, November.
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