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The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms

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Author Info
Peleg, Bezalel
Tijs, Stef

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Abstract

We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. We also indicate how to generalize our results to Bayesian and extensive games.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 25 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 13-34
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:13-34

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  1. Voorneveld, M. & Vermeulen, D. & Borm, P., 1997. "Axiomatizations of Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games," Research Memorandum 749, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Indrajit Ray & Lin Zhou, . "Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences," Discussion Papers 00/15, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Mark Voorneveld & Anne van den Nouweland, 2001. "Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria; An Investigation of Core Concepts," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-11, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jun 2001. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Voorneveld, Mark, 2002. "Preparation and toolkit learning," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Miglierina Enrico & Molho Elena & Patrone Fioravante & Steff H. Tijs, 2005. "An axiomatic approach to approximate solutions in vector optimization," Economics and Quantitative Methods qf0507, Department of Economics, University of Insubria. [Downloadable!]
  6. E. Miglierina & E. Molho & F. Patrone & S. Tijs, 2008. "Axiomatic approach to approximate solutions in multiobjective optimization," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 95-115, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Takuya Masuzawa, 2008. "Computing the cores of strategic games with punishment–dominance relations," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 185-201, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Voorneveld, Mark & Kets, Willemien & Norde, Henk, 2005. "An axiomatization of minimal curb sets," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 18 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Heumen, R. van, 1994. "Characterizations of Solutions for Bayesian Games," Research Memorandum 680, Tilburg University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  10. Suijs, J. & Hamers, H. & Tijs, S., 1995. "On Consistency of Reward Allocation Rules in Sequencing Situations," Discussion Paper 18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Werner Güth, 2002. "On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 371-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, 2002. "The Measure of Intellectual Influence," Working Papers 2002-13, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Siegfried Berninghaus & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, . "Reflections on Equilibrium - Ideal Rationality and Analytic Decomposition of Games," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003-08, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Koji Takamiya, 2006. "Consistency and Unanimity in the House Allocation Problems I: Collective Initial Endowments," ISER Discussion Paper 0657, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
  15. van den Nouweland, A. & Wooders, M.H., 2001. "Axiomatization of Ratio Equilibria in Public Good Economies," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 585, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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