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Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria; An Investigation of Core Concepts

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  • Mark Voorneveld

    () (Tilburg University Department of Econometrics and CentER)

  • Anne van den Nouweland

    () (University of Oregon Economics Department)

Abstract

A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different criteria are not condensed by means of a utility function, but left in their own right. Moreover, the games considered are not single-valued, but each coalition can realize a set of vectors representing the outcomes of each of the criteria depending on several alternatives. Two core concepts are defined: the core and the dominance outcome core. The relation between the two concepts is studied and the core is axiomatized by means of consistency properties.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Oregon Economics Department in its series University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers with number 2001-11.

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Length: 22
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2001
Date of revision: 01 Jun 2001
Handle: RePEc:ore:uoecwp:2001-11

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  1. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
  2. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
  3. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
  4. Norde, Henk & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 1996. "Equilibrium selection and consistency," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-3813, Maastricht University.
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Cited by:
  1. Hinojosa, M. A. & Marmol, A. M. & Thomas, L. C., 2005. "Core, least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(1), pages 225-238, July.

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