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An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations

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  • Peleg, Bezalel

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

  • Sudhölter, Peter

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

Abstract

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  • Peleg, Bezalel & Sudhölter, Peter, 2017. "An axiomatisation of Nash equilibria in economic situations," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 230, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:230
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peleg, Bezalel & Potters, Jos A M & Tijs, Stef H, 1996. "Minimality of Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games, in Particular for Potential Games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(1), pages 81-93, January.
    2. Norde, Henk & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 1996. "Equilibrium Selection and Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 219-225, February.
    3. Patrone, F. & Pieri, G. & Tijs, S.H. & Torre, A., 1996. "On Consistent Solutions for Strategic Games," Other publications TiSEM 07b489e5-dff2-45d0-bd65-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
    5. Shafer, Wayne & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1975. "Equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 345-348, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Core," Working Papers 1817, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    2. Gonzalez, Stéphane & Lardon, Aymeric, 2021. "Axiomatic foundations of the core for games in effectiveness form," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 28-38.
    3. Stéphane Gonzalez & Aymeric Lardon, 2018. "Axiomatic Foundations of a Unifying Concept of the Core of Games in Effectiveness Form," GREDEG Working Papers 2018-15, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    4. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    5. Voorneveld, Mark, 2019. "An axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 316-321.
    6. Voorneveld, Mark, 2019. "An elementary axiomatization of the Nash equilibrium concept," SSE Working Paper Series in Economics 2019:1, Stockholm School of Economics.

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