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Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria : An Investigation of Core Concepts

Author

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  • Voorneveld, M.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M.

Abstract

A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different criteria are not condensed by means of a utility function, but left in their own right. Moreover, the games considered are not single-valued, but each coalition can realize a set of vectors representing the outcomes of each of the criteria depending on several alternatives. Two core concepts are defined: the core and the dominance outcome core. The relation between the two concepts is studied and the core is axiomatized by means of consistency properties.
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Suggested Citation

  • Voorneveld, M. & van den Nouweland, C.G.A.M., 1998. "Cooperative Multicriteria Games with Public and Private Criteria : An Investigation of Core Concepts," Discussion Paper 1998-62, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:8c732445-5aa9-445f-9564-4d4d2c13bb6c
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peleg, B, 1986. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 15(3), pages 187-200.
    2. Peleg, Bezalel & Tijs, Stef, 1996. "The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(1), pages 13-34.
    3. Peleg, Bezalel, 1985. "An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 203-214, April.
    4. Norde, Henk & Potters, Jos & Reijnierse, Hans & Vermeulen, Dries, 1996. "Equilibrium Selection and Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 219-225, February.
    5. Peleg, B, 1987. "On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 16(4), pages 290-290.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hinojosa, M. A. & Marmol, A. M. & Thomas, L. C., 2005. "Core, least core and nucleolus for multiple scenario cooperative games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 164(1), pages 225-238, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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