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Implementation theory with incomplete information

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Author Info
Beth Allen
Abstract

This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For economies with asymmetric information, cooperative games based on incentive compatibility constraints or Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms are derived and examined.

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File URL: http://minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr226.pdf
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis in its series Staff Report with number 226.

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Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedmsr:226

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Keywords: Game theory

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  1. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Postlewaite, Andrew & Schmeidler, David, 1986. "Implementation in differential information economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 14-33, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 509-24, October.
  4. Boyd, John H. & Prescott, Edward C., 1986. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 211-232, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Harris Milton & Townsend, Robert M, 1981. "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 33-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1978. "Arbitration of Two-party Disputes under Uncertainty," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(3), pages 595-604, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 17-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
  10. Berliant, Marcus, 1992. "On income taxation and the core," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 121-141, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Maskin, Eric, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Ehud Kalai & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1976. "Arbitration of Two-Party Disputes Under Ignorance," Discussion Papers 215, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  14. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David, 1990. "Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 207-227, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Jackson, Matthew O, 1991. "Bayesian Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(2), pages 461-77, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Ledyard, John O., 1986. "The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 59-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1991. "Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 198-203, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1986. "Private information in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 34-58, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Krasa, Stefan & Yannelis, Nicholas C, 1994. "The Value Allocation of an Economy with Differential Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 881-900, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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