Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 9 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
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- Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002.
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