Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 767.
Date of creation: Mar 1988
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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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- Qingmin Liu & George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite & Larry Samuelson, 2010.
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