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Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy

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Author Info
Kahn Charles M.
Mookherjee Dilip

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-45S93BX-46/2/93cd3ebff74b394d7d8e1f84d50a2af4
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 66 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 113-138
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:66:y:1995:i:1:p:113-138

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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  1. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1994. "Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 61-95. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bhaskar Dutta & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Incomplete Information, Credibility and the Core," Working Papers 2001-02, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Dan Anderberg, 1999. "Adverse selection, competition, and linear self-insurance," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 3-15, Spring. [Downloadable!]
  5. Lazarova, Emiliya & Borm, Peter & Velzen, Bas van, 2005. "Contracts and insurance group formation by myopic players," Discussion Paper 89, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
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