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Non-Discriminating Renegotiation in a Competitive Insurance Market

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Author Info

  • Asheim, G.B.
  • Nilssen, T.

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie in its series Papers with number 25.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:lavale:25

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.

Related research

Keywords: COMPETITION; INSURANCE;

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References

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  1. Herschel I. Grossman, 1979. "Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 336-343, Spring.
  2. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets," Cahiers de recherche 9134, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  3. Lacker, J.M. & Weinberg, J.A., 1990. "A "Coalition Proof" Equilibrium For A Private Information Credit Economy," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 994, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  4. Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June.
  5. Bengt Holmstrom & Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce D. Smith, 1988. "Organizations in Economic Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 477-91, August.
  7. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  8. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopoly, Non-linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 407-30, October.
  9. McAfee, R Preston & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 210-30, March.
  10. Barry Nalebuff & Andres Rodriguez & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1993. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device," NBER Working Papers 4357, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Rasmusen, E. & Fernandez, L., 1993. "Perfectly Contestable Monopoly and Adverse Selection," Papers 93-016, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
  12. Spence, Michael, 1978. "Product differentiation and performance in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 427-447, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, June.
  2. John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The adverse selection approach to financial intermediation: some characteristics of the equilibrium financial structure," Working Paper 95-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  3. Raduna, Daniela Viviana & Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2011. "Risk aversion influence on insurance market," MPRA Paper 37725, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Feb 2012.
  4. Alexander Alegria & Manuel Willington, 2007. "Collusion in a One-Period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv196, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
  5. Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 3412, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  7. Inderst, Roman & Wambach, Achim, 1999. "Competitive Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection and Capacity Constraints," CEPR Discussion Papers 2269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 International Congress, August 23-27, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark 24639, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  9. Ania, Ana B. & Troger, Thomas & Wambach, Achim, 2002. "An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 153-184, August.
  10. Wang, Yanguo & Jaenicke, Edward C., 2005. "Pooling, Separating, and Cream-Skimming In Relative-Performance Contracts," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19522, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

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