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Does adverse selection justify government intervention in loan markets?

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  • Jeffrey M. Lacker

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its journal Economic Quarterly.

Volume (Year): (1994)
Issue (Month): Win ()
Pages: 61-95

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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:1994:i:win:p:61-95

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Related research

Keywords: Bank supervision ; Credit;

References

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  1. Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June.
  2. William G. Gale, 1988. "Economic Effects of Federal Credit Programs," UCLA Economics Working Papers 483, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Jeffrey M. Lacker, 1991. "Why is there debt?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Jul, pages 3-19.
  4. Bruce D. Smith & Michael J. Stutzer, 1989. "Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 177-193.
  5. Innes, Robert, 1991. "Investment and government intervention in credit markets when there is asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 347-381, December.
  6. N. Gregory Mankiw, 1986. "The Allocation of Credit and Financial Collapse," NBER Working Papers 1786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Hellwig,Martin, 1986. "Some recent developments in the theory of competition in markets with adverse selection," Discussion Paper Serie A 82, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Williamson, Stephen D, 1994. "Do Informational Frictions Justify Federal Credit Programs?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 523-44, August.
  9. John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers 071, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
  11. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  12. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "Deriving strong and coalition-proof nash equilibria from an abstract system," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 195-202, October.
  13. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  14. Rudolph G. Penner, 1989. "Credit Rationing and Government Loan Programs: A Welfare Analysis," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 194-196.
  15. Greenwald, Bruce C & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 229-64, May.
  16. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 1985. "Financial intermediary-coalitions," Staff Report 87, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  17. Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn.
  18. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Jeffrey M. Lacker & John A. Weinberg, 1995. "The coalition-proof core in adverse selection economies," Working Paper 94-09, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  2. Wenli Li, 1998. "Government loan, guarantee, and grant programs: an evaluation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Fall, pages 25-52.
  3. John A. Weinberg, 1994. "Firm size, finance, and investment," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 19-40.
  4. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2011. "Risk absorption by the state: when is it good public policy ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5893, The World Bank.
  5. Busetta, Giovanni & Zazzaro, Alberto, 2012. "Mutual loan-guarantee societies in monopolistic credit markets with adverse selection," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 15-24.
  6. Mireille Jaeger, 2000. "Vente à perte dans le secteur bancaire et avantage concurrentiel des banques mutuelles et coopératives," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 195-216.
  7. Li, Wenli, 2002. "Entrepreneurship and government subsidies: A general equilibrium analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 26(11), pages 1815-1844, September.
  8. Anginer, Deniz & de la Torre, Augusto & Ize, Alain, 2014. "Risk-bearing by the state: When is it good public policy?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 76-86.

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