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Vente à perte dans le secteur bancaire et avantage concurrentiel des banques mutuelles et coopératives

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  • Mireille Jaeger

Abstract

[fre] La question posée dans cet article porte sur l’existence d’un avantage concurrentiel éventuel bénéficiant aux mutuelles ou coopératives bancaires, vis-à-vis des banques à statut de sociétés anonymes (banques-SA). Cet avantage tiendrait à la possibilité qu’ont les mutuelles de ne pas rémunérer leurs fonds propres au taux du marché, du fait des péréquations qu’elles peuvent effectuer entre leurs partenaires, sociétaires, emprunteurs, déposants, qui sont souvent confondus et sont l’objet de subventions croisées. On démontre alors que pour optimiser la situation de ses sociétaires, une mutuelle doit annuler la rémunération de ses fonds propres pour diminuer le plus possible le taux des crédits qu’elle leur consent. Ce taux correspond à un tarif de vente à perte pour les banques-SA, contraintes de s’aligner pour conserver leurs parts de marché, mais incapables à ce tarif, de rémunérer normalement leurs actionnaires. En France, cet avantage concurrentiel des mutuelles, qui en pratique est relativement limité, n’a pas provoqué de bouleversement dans les parts de marché du crédit. Il semble se traduire plutôt par une accumulation de réserves libres en capital, qui les place en position stratégique favorable dans les opérations de restructuration. . Classification JEL : G21, L13 [eng] Selling at a loss in the banking sector and competitive advantage for mutual and cooperative banks . It is often claimed that, in France, some banks (the so-called « mutual-banks ») have an unfair advantage over the other financial intermediaries. This advantage would come from the fact that these mutual banks don’t face the same market constraints regarding their return on equity ratio. Thus, these mutual banks can make loans at substantially lower rates than other banks. This articles shows first, that this competitive edge is not so important as is often argued ; moreover, the mutual banks seem efficient. . JEL Classification : G21, L13

Suggested Citation

  • Mireille Jaeger, 2000. "Vente à perte dans le secteur bancaire et avantage concurrentiel des banques mutuelles et coopératives," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 56(1), pages 195-216.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2000_num_56_1_3821
    DOI: 10.3406/ecofi.2000.3821
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2000.3821
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuelle Nys, 2008. "Service provision and loans : Price and risk implications," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 118(3), pages 411-428.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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