Economic Rationality And The Areeda-Turner Rule
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- William Comanor & H. Frech, 2015. "Economic Rationality and the Areeda–Turner Rule," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(3), pages 253-268, May.
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Cited by:
- Stephen Martin, 2015. "Areeda–Turner and the Treatment of Exclusionary Pricing under U.S. Antitrust and EU Competition Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(3), pages 229-252, May.
- Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
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More about this item
Keywords
Social and Behavioral Sciences; Predatory Pricing; Antitrust; Monopolization; Areeda-Turner Rule; Credibility; Subgame Perfection; Rationality; Chain-Store Paradox;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2015-04-02 (Industrial Competition)
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